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States and federal territories of Malaysia

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The states and federal territories of Malaysia are the primary administrative divisions of the country. Malaysia comprises a federation of 13 states (Negeri) and 3 federal territories (Wilayah Persekutuan).

States and federal territories

[edit]

Eleven states and two federal territories are located on the Malay Peninsula, collectively called Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia. Two states and one federal territory lie on the island of Borneo; they are collectively referred to as East Malaysia.[1]: 2  Of the 13 states in Malaysia, 9 are monarchies.[1]: 175 

States

[edit]
Flag[2]: 336–361  Emblem State Capital[2]: 336–361  Royal capital[2]: 336–361  Pop.[3] Area
(km2)[4]
Licence
plate
[5]
Area code[6] ISO[7][8] HDI[9] Head of state[2]: 329  Head of government[10]: 208 [11]: 109 
Flag of Johor
Coat of arms of Johor
Johor Johor Bahru Muar 4,186,300 19,210 J 07,
06 (Muar & Tangkak)
MY-01 0.821 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Kedah
Coat of arms of Kedah
Kedah Alor Setar Anak Bukit 2,217,500 9,500 K 04 MY-02 0.804 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Kelantan
Coat of arms of Kelantan
Kelantan Kota Bharu Kubang Kerian 1,888,500 15,099 D 09 MY-03 0.774 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Malacca
Coat of arms of Malacca
Malacca Malacca City 1,047,100 1,664 M 06 MY-04 0.831 Yang di-Pertua Negeri
(Governor)
Chief Minister
Flag of Negeri Sembilan
Coat of arms of Negeri Sembilan
Negeri Sembilan Seremban Seri Menanti 1,240,100 6,686 N 06 MY-05 0.825 Yang di-Pertuan Besar
(Grand Ruler)
Menteri Besar
Flag of Pahang
Coat of arms of Pahang
Pahang Kuantan Pekan 1,668,200 36,137 C 09,
03 (Genting Highlands),
05 (Cameron Highlands)
MY-06 0.801 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Penang
Coat of arms of Penang
Penang George Town 1,800,400 1,048 P 04 MY-07 0.841 Yang di-Pertua Negeri
(Governor)
Chief Minister
Flag of Perak
Coat of arms of Perak
Perak Ipoh Kuala Kangsar 2,569,600 21,035 A 05,
04 (Pengkalan Hulu)
MY-08 0.812 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Perlis
Coat of arms of Perlis
Perlis Kangar Arau 296,800 821 R 04 MY-09 0.801 Raja Menteri Besar
Flag of Sabah
Coat of arms of Sabah
Sabah Kota Kinabalu 3,742,200 73,631 S 08 MY-12 0.772 Yang di-Pertua Negeri
(Governor)
Chief Minister
Flag of Sarawak
Coat of arms of Sarawak
Sarawak Kuching 2,518,100 124,450 Q 08 MY-13 0.824 Yang di-Pertua Negeri
(Governor)
Premier
Flag of Selangor
Coat of arms of Selangor
Selangor Shah Alam Klang 7,363,400 8,104 B 03 MY-10 0.859 Sultan Menteri Besar
Flag of Terengganu
Coat of arms of Terengganu
Terengganu Kuala Terengganu 1,232,100 13,035 T 09 MY-11 0.796 Sultan Menteri Besar

Federal Territories

[edit]
Flag[2]: 362–367  Emblem Federal Territory Pop.[3] Area (km2)[4] License plate[5] Area code[6][12] ISO[7][8] HDI[9] Head of government[13]
Flag of Kuala Lumpur
Seal of Kuala Lumpur
Kuala Lumpur 2,067,500 243 W / V 03 MY-14 0.863 Mayor
Flag of Labuan
Seal of Labuan
Labuan 100,800 91 L 087 MY-15 0.782 CEO of Labuan Corporation
Flag of Putrajaya
Seal of Putrajaya
Putrajaya 120,300 49 F 038 MY-16 N/A President of Putrajaya Corporation

History

[edit]

Creation of the federation

[edit]

Malaysia's federal system arose due the preservation of existing sultanates on the Malay Peninsula who came under British control.[14] The initial British possessions in the region, Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Malacca in 1825, were directly controlled by the UK. However, later expansion was carried out through the establishment of protectorates.[15]: 225  The 1826 Burney Treaty between Siam and the United Kingdom saw Thailand relinquish its claims over Pahang, Perak, and all territory to their south, although the United Kingdom did not claim this territory.[15]: 231  In 1873, policy changes under John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley, led to British intervention in the Larut Wars in Perak, the Klang War in Selangor, and in Sungei Ujong (now part of Negeri Sembilan). Beginning in 1874, Andrew Clarke forced the rulers of these sultanates to accept British oversight, establishing the residency system and creating the first formal protectorates. A resident was installed in Pahang in 1888, while the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 brought Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu under British control. A protectorate over Johor was established in 1914, bringing all territory south of Siam under British control.[15]: 232–233, 235  The establishment of such residences brought the Sultans under indirect rule, however it also strengthened their domestic control by developing new administrative structures under them.[16]: 210  The Sultans who had moved from Thai to British sovereignty, along with Johor, resisted a full Resident, instead accepting less powerful Advisors.[16]: 211 

In 1895, the Federated Malay States was created, bringing together Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor into a shared governmental structure. The power of this new body over the individual sultanates was kept limited, to ensure the United Kingdom remained on good terms with the Sultans, setting a precedent for later attempts at unification.[17]: 3–5  The remaining five sultanates became known as the Unfederated Malay States,[18] while the directly ruled Penang, Malacca, and Singapore became knows as the Straits Settlements. The demographics and economies of these groups diverged, with the Straits Settlements turning into cosmopolitan cities, while the Federated Malay States saw Chinese and Indian immigration to urban areas. In rural areas, and among the Unfederated Malay States, the population remained mostly Malay, and economies grew slower.[16]: 211  The civil services of each of the Federated Malay States were merged with those of Penang and Malacca. Other services, including police, health, education, and law, also saw consolidation across borders.[19]: 9  On the island of Borneo, North Borneo and Sarawak became British protectorates in 1888.[20] Brunei also became a British protectorate around this time.[16]: 211 

Movement towards bringing these disparately ruled territories together was resisted until the Second World War led to a Japanese invasion in 1942.[16]: 211  In 1946, shortly following the end of Japanese occupation, the nine sultanates under British protection were joined together with Malacca and Penang to form the Malayan Union. This had a strong central government, removing most power from the Sultans. This, alongside other issues, made the union greatly unpopular,[15]: 225 [21]: 146  and in 1948 it was replaced with the 11-state Federation of Malaya.[14] This union was structured to preserve the identity of the component states, and included consultation mechanisms for when there was disagreement between state and central government. The agreement of the Sultans (who formed the Conference of Rulers) was needed for any constitutional change, forcing the ruling Alliance Party to negotiate with the Sultans as it established governmental structures.[17]: 5–6 

Malaya became independent with a new constitution drafted by the Reid Commission in 1957,[14][21]: 147  with its federal system inspired by the Constitution of India,[22]: 66  overcoming independence movements in Johor, in Kelantan, and in Penang.[17]: 6 [22]: 86  This constitution gave the central government significant power, in part influenced by a desire to grow the economy and an ongoing insurgency. While the governing coalition was led by the Malay UMNO, it incorporated Chinese and Indian parties whose members were less concerned with preserving the power of the Sultans.[23]: 490–491  Alliance convincingly won the first post-independence election in 1959, winning 9 of the then-11 states.[16]: 213 

In Borneo, North Borneo and Sarawak came under direct British control as crown colonies in 1946, following the Second World War.[20] The political interests of leaders in Malaya and Singapore, which aligned with British strategic interests, led to discussions to expand the federation to encompass other British territories in Southeast Asia, namely Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore. While Brunei pulled out of negotiations,[24]: 4–6  in 1963 Malaya was joined with three new states: Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore, becoming Malaysia. This expansion, sometimes also described as the creation of a new federation, was created through the Malaysia Agreement, under which the new states had greater autonomy than the 11 existing states. Singapore became independent in 1965, leaving the current 13 states.[14][11]: 92  Local parties in Sabah and Sarawak soon aligned themselves with Alliance.[16]: 213  It is not known if the Conference of Rulers gave its approval for the expansion of the country, indicating the early dominance of the central government.[17]: 6  Objections to the expansion by Kelantan, which argued the expansion effectively abolished the previous federation and thus that it should not bind Kelantan, were dismissed by the courts.[17]: 7 [22]: 83 

Dominant party rule

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The Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, led by the UMNO party, controlled the national government from independence until 2018.[14] In particular, control of government gradually consolidated under UMNO party leadership and the Prime Minister's Department (PMD).[23]: 492  The continuous rule of BN facilitated the shift of power towards the central government. Party loyalists were appointed to federal and state positions. Institutional checks, such as the veto power of the Senate, were weakened. New national laws and institutions circumvented the formal powers of the states. This control could allow for quite granular interventions, for example through the Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board, the federal government could manage local-level bus routes.[23]: 492–493  The National Council for Local Government was formed in 1960, formalising federal influence at the local level.[23]: 493  Local council elections were suspended in 1965.[17]: 8  In 1964, the Senate was expanded to include 32 appointees of the central government, increasing from 22 and meaning central government appointees outnumber the sum of all senators appointed by states (two from each state).[19]: 4 

Following independence, two main opposition groups arose. The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) gained support in the northeast, especially Kelantan and Terengganu, while opposition non-Malay groups gained support in parts of the west coast: Penang, Perak, and Selangor. PAS won in Kelantan and Terengganu in 1959, although in 1961 defections in the Terengganu parliament gave control to UMNO. The national government arrested some PAS leaders, charging them with supporting Indonesia in the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation. However, it was unable to win Kelantan in the 1964 or 1969 elections. The 1969 Malaysian general election also saw UMNO lose Penang to Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, and hung parliaments emerge in Perak and Selangor.[16]: 218  While PAS did not win another state, it won almost 24% of the popular vote nationally.[16]: 219  The disruptive political results were followed by race riots. The national government suspended the constitution and parliament as a response. While emergency rule was ended after 20 months, BN gained a consistent two-thirds parliamentary majority afterwards.[25]: 428  Gerakan, PAS, and other opposition parties made agreements with UMNO, and Alliance was reformed into the broader Barisan Nasional (BN).[16]: 219 

Control over the economy was centralised through the 1971 New Economic Policy.[17]: 8  The Petroleum Development Act 1974 shifted control of oil and natural gas production in Sabah, Sarawak, and Teregganu to the national government, in exchange for 5% of profit.[21]: 163  The Local Government Act 1976 conferred some powers over local government to the national government.[23]: 493  1976 also saw the national constitution amended to symbolically declare Sabah and Sarawak equivalent to the other states.[23]: 496  State Economic Development Corporations became effectively controlled by the federal government in the mid-1970s, despite being initially established by states.[23]: 493 [25]: 431  Privitisation efforts in the 1980s and 1990s saw control of public services removed from states in favour of private companies. The central government imposed bureaucratic barriers to give it control over some state decisions, and withheld funding from state governments that disagreed with it,[17]: 8  such as halting general subsidies to Kelantan during periods when it was governed by the opposition, and halting oil proceeds to Terengganu in a similar situation.[21]: 163 

The constitution was amended to make tourism a federal responsibility in 1994 without consulting the states, although in practice states still promote their own tourism. It was also amended to make water management a concurrent responsibility rather than a state one in 2006.[11]: 96  Over time, the Senate has slowly become more dominated by appointments by the central government, reducing the power of those appointed by states.[17]: 7–8  National government control of Islam has also grown. The creation of Malaysia Economic Corridors, which operate under the PMD, brought three quarters of land under a parallel structure of government control to that of the states.[23]: 494 

The proportion of revenue that went to the national government became even more lopsided, increasing from 80.5% after the formation of Malaysia to 90.7% in the late 2000s.[25]: 426 [19]: 13  The national government began to fund states more through loans than through grants.[25]: 431–432  With state funding dependent not only on their own revenue but on federal government favour, there was unequal development, with the public sector growing in some states and decreasing in others. Relative to GDP, the public sector was consistently small in Sabah and Sarawak.[26]: 446  Kedah saw high relative growth in the late 20th century, coinciding with the long rule of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who was from that state.[26]: 453 

Due to this control, state governments were heavily influenced by the national government, reducing the theoretical impact of the federal system. The national government was effectively able to select the Chief Ministers of each state. Until 2008, UMNO also led almost all of the state governments,[14] never losing control of more than 2 at a time.[16]: 208  In Sabah and Sarawak, local parties often aligned themselves with BN,[14] and the central government intervened to shape the development of the politics of its new states.[27]: 6  The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 was an early example of central government power. The Chief Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak, Fuad Stephens and Stephen Kalong Ningkan respectively, were not consulted on the expulsion by Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.[27]: 5–6  In 1966, the federal government engineered the removal of Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Chief Minister of Sarawak, eventually declaring a state of emergency to resolve the constitutional crisis that had emerged in its favour.[14] Both the federal and Sarawak constitutions were amended to enable the dismissals of chief ministers.[25]: 429–430  In 1970, an UMNO-friendly government was elected in Sarawak.[16]: 221 

The autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak gradually diminished in practice, despite the assurances of the Malaysia Agreement, although their indigenous populations were granted bumiputera status in 1971. Upon forming Malaysia the constitution was changed to list the new states separately from the existing ones, however a later amendment combined this into one list. The federal government facilitated the spread of Islam in the new states, and it became the official religion of Sabah in 1973. The civil service in Sabah and Sarawak is dominated by individuals from West Malaysia, and both states received only 5% of the royalties derived from natural resource exploitation in their territory.[14] The national Electoral Commission controlled state constituency boundaries.[27]: 8  The independence of East Pakistan led to the use of "Peninsular Malaysia" becoming officially preferred to "West Malaysia", and "Sabah and Sarawak" replacing "East Malaysia", to reduce links between the two Bornean states.[26]: 442  Overall, the federal government clashed more with the Sabahan government than the Sarawakian one.[26]: 449 [16]: 223–225  Development grants allocated to both states lessened over time.[26]: 449  While they were higher per capita than those given to other states, the relative underdevelopment of those two states has persisted since federation,[26]: 453  with a net transfer of wealth away from the two states.[16]: 225 

Kelantan elected the opposition Malaysian Islamic Party in 1959, and they governed until 1978.[23]: 499  That year, the chief minister was effectively removed by the federal government.[11]: 96  This crisis, precipitated by a split in PAS between those who supported and opposed an alliance with the federal government, led to UMNO expelling PAS from BN. A February 1978 snap election in which campaigning was banned saw PAS lose the state to UMNO and its allies, being reduced to two of the 36 seats in the Kelantan parliament. PAS recovered only in 1988, when a member of the Kelantan royal family left UMNO after losing a leadership election, and formed an electoral alliance with PAS which won the state's 1990 election.[16]: 219–220  Kelantan returned to opposition control in 1990.[10]: 194  In 1991, when two Kelantan lawmakers defected to UMNO, Kelantan amended its constitution to require a by-election. This change would remove the ability of UMNO to entice defectors, which it had done in several states before. The amendment was however struck down by the Supreme Court.[16]: 221 

Outside of Kelantan, opposition parties did not see much electoral success. Notable periods of opposition rule occurred in Sabah (1985-1994) and Terengganu (1999-2004).[10]: 194  When the opposition held Sabah, development funding was shifted to other states, and timber exports, which were a source of state funding, were banned. The central government worked directly with local authorities, bypassing the state government, and encouraged voting for BN as a way to receive investments.[23]: 494  In the 1990s some Sabahan politicians calling for autonomy were accused of fostering secession and detained.[10]: 199  The 1990s also saw UMNO officially start operating in Sabah. Its activities there sought to undermine local parties, and its Sabahan branch even accepted non-Muslims as party members. After taking control in 1994, UMNO instituted a system of rotating chief ministers, meaning none served a full term.[26]: 451 

From 1990, development funding to Kelantan was also reduced, with the state receiving the second-smallest allocation.[23]: 500  The federal government also stopped providing oil royalties. to Kelantan.[25]: 432  In 2000, the national government shifted petroleum royalties paid by Petronas from Terengganu to the federal government, replacing it with a smaller direct transfer from the federal to state government.[23]: 500  (Royalties were restored upon the return of UMNO to power in 2004,[28]: 336 , but in 2015 Petronas ceased all payments to the state government.[23]: 500 ) The tensions created by these changes exacerbated existing inequality, with Kelantan and Terengganu being relatively poor states.[26]: 446  The general strength of the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in these northeastern states and their neighbours was a result of both rising political Islam and continued poverty.[26]: 451–453 

In 1993, the constitution was amended to strip state royalty of legal immunity, with the central government stripping all support from the monarchies it legally could and engaging in a public relations campaign in order to obtain royal consent for the amendment.[20] The 1997 Asian financial crisis led to the national government to take on further control of public services.[23]: 494  Some companies that had taken over utilities from states were nationalised under the federal government. Some that were not became supervised by federal commissions, which lacked state representatives.[25]: 432–433 

After independence, the concept of federal territories directly administered by the federal government arose. In 1973, Kuala Lumpur was separated from Selangor to become a separate territory, partly as a response to the a race riot that occurred in the city in 1969. Labuan, a British territory since 1847 that was joined to North Borneo in 1946, was split from Sabah in 1984 to become an offshore financial centre. A third, Putrajaya, was split from Selangor in 2001 to serve as the administrative capital.[27]: 7, 11 [20][23]: 491 

Revival of federalism

[edit]

The elections in 2008 saw BN lose its two-thirds majority in the national parliament,[21]: 146  It also saw Penang, Perak, Kedah, and Selangor elect opposition governments, while the government of the opposition-led Kelantan increased its majority.[29] The opposition wins in the relatively wealthier west coast states limited the tools BN had previously used in poorer states.[16]: 226  The opposition formed the broad Pakatan Rakyat alliance to contest the election, united primarily by opposition to BN rather than by ideology.[23]: 502 [29]

The loss of economically important states provided a new political platform for the opposition, and created a visible alternative to BN rule. The national government responded to the loss of these states by further strengthening central power. The budget of the PMD was expanded, and by 2012 was by itself 10 times larger than the budget of Selangor, and 15 times the budget of Penang. New agencies within the PMD gained increased control over economic planning, with the PMD controlling 25% of economic planning by 2015.[23]: 489–490  The Ministry of Tourism ended cooperation with opposition-led states, and shifted Tourist Action Councils in those states under federal control. Civil servants and workers for federal ministries in opposition-run states were instructed not to attend state government functions,[19]: 10  and Village Development and Safety Committees and Residents' Representation Committees began reporting directly to the federal government, as opposed to BN-run states where they reported to state governments.[19]: 11 

In Perak, the BN induced three state legislators to defect, creating a constitutional crisis when the Sultan then appointed an UMNO-led government. While this was initially reversed by the Malaya High court, it was endorsed by the Court of Appeal.[23]: 495 

The 2011 Tenth Malaysia Plan dropped all mention of cooperating with the states regarding economic development, contrasting with previous plans.[23]: 496  The federally-run State development offices of Penang and Selangor began operating from outside of those states, and stopped sending reports to the state governments.[25]: 432  New economic growth corridors were set up, extending federal control over the 76% of the country they covered.[25]: 437–438 

Penang and Selangor went on to join Kelantan in becoming opposition strongholds.[30]: 2–3  In 2010, Selangor and Penang appealed to the Electoral Commission for the reinstatement of local elections. This was denied, with the Commission stating that approval was needed from the National Council for Local Government.[19]: 9  In 2012, Penang tried again to reintroduce local elections, however this was ignored by the Electoral Commission and blocked by the courts.[23]: 501  Selangor unsuccessfully tried to regain control of water infrastructure privatised by the previous state government,[25]: 434  and both states tried to regain control of waste management.[19]: 2  It also sought to amend its constitution to gain control of its civil service, which did not reach the two-thirds majority required.[25]: 427  The persistence of such opposition governments influenced changes in BN rule. UMNO committed to running more female candidates following opposition commitments to do so. Efforts by the Selangor government to improve bus services and subsidise housing were imitated by the federal government.[23]: 502–503 

Disputes with the national government also emerged in BN-led states. Oil revenue distribution was raised by Kelantan, Sabah, Sarawak, and Terengganu.[19]: 2  Sarawak used its importance to the small BN majority in parliament to extract concessions from Petronas, and set up its own oil company.[19]: 14 [30]: 19  In 2016 Mukhriz Mahathir was removed from his position as Chief Minister of Kedah after criticising the Prime Minister, despite Mahathir being an UMNO member.[23]: 494  In 2017 the Minister of the Federal Territories proposed converting Penang, Langkawi (part of Kedah), and parts of Malacca into federal territories, a symbolic assertion of national government power.[23]: 501 

The rise of the opposition, and thus the weakening of BN, also provided political space for the Sultans to reassert their influence.[16]: 209  In 2015 the Crown Prince of Johor asserted Johor had the right to secede if its autonomy was infringed upon.[23]: 501 

State government changes following the 2018 election[30]: 26 
State Government
change
(E=election,
C=other change)
Coalition in
government
Johor May 2018 (E)
March 2020 (C)
March 2022 (E)
PH
BN-PN
BN
Kedah May 2018 (E)
February 2020 (C)
May 2020 (C)
August 2023 (E)
PH
PH-Bersatu
PN-BN
PN
Kelantan May 2018 (E)
March 2020 (C)
August 2023 (E)
PAS
PN
PN
Malacca May 2018 (E)
March 2020 (C)
November 2021 (E)
April 2023 (C)
PH
BN-PN
BN
BN-PH
Negeri Sembilan May 2018 (E)
August 2023 (E)
PH
PH-BN
Pahang May 2018 (E)
November 2022 (E)
BN
BN-PH
Penang May 2018 (E)
August 2023 (E)
PH
PH-BN
Perak May 2018 (E)
March 2020 (C)
November 2022 (E)
PH
BN-PN
BN-PH
Perlis May 2018 (E)
November 2022 (E)
BN
PN
Sabah May 2018 (E)
May 2018 (C)
September 2020 (E)
BN
Warisan-PH-UPKO
GRS
Sarawak December 2021 (E) GPS
Selangor May 2018 (E)
August 2023 (E)
PH
PH-BN
Terengganu May 2018 (E)
March 2020 (C)
August 2023 (E)
PAS
PN
PN

In 2014, the federal government softened its longstanding opposition to the introduction of Hudud punishments in Kelantan. This may have been politically influenced, to split the Islamist Malaysian Islamic Party from others in Pakatan Rakyat, and to shore up support among rural Malays. Pakatan Rakyat dissolved in 2015.[23]: 502  The Pakatan Harapan (PH) opposition alliance was formed to contest the 2018 Malaysian general election. Its election manifesto explicitly called for a revival of "the true spirit of federalism", as well as the promise to restore the autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak.[19]: 2 

The 2018 election saw BN lose power at the national level for the first time.[14] BN also lost power in 8 of the 10 states it governed prior to that election.[17]: 1  State governments saw a period of shifting coalitions and much more complex party politics,[30]: 2 [17]: 6  and discussions about state power, including the status of Sabah and Sarawak, became active political topics.[14] The PH government formed a Parliamentary Special Select Committee to discuss Federal-State relations[19]: 2  which met until the end their government.[30]: 5  In 2019 Sarawak took its claim for oil sales tax payments to court. This case was won in 2020, and in 2022 an agreement was also reached for Sabah to receive this sales tax revenue.[30]: 19 

The Sheraton Move in February 2020, in which the PH government was unseated by a change in parliamentary coalitions and replaced by the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, was followed by similar coalition shifts changing government in four states.[30]: 2  This instability meant that for the first time outside of Sarawak, state electoral calendars fell out of alignment with national elections.[30]: 22–23  The national committee on Federal-State relations was not re-established by the 2020 government, however discussion continued on the relationship with Sabah and Sarawak.[30]: 6  Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob agreed to increase parliamentary representation for Sabah and Sarawak to 35% (up from 25%), however this did not occur before the next national election. (The combined population of both states is 17.4% of the national population.)[30]: 16–17 

After the 2022 Malaysian general election formed a national coalition form between PH and BN, many state governments led by PH or BN adopted this national alliance and brought the other into government at the state level. In Johor, the concept of an official opposition was replaced by the idea of a "balancing force", and the PH-affiliated former opposition adopted this role instead of joining the UMNO government. In Terengganu, PN won all seats, leading to there being no opposition.[30]: 2–3 

Neither BN or PH campaigned on federal issues in general, although both had specific promises for Sabah and Sarawak.[30]: 6  Continuing the trend of prior governments, a government body was established to facilitate discussions about Sabah and Sarawak.[30]: 9  Through this body it has been agreed, among other things, that gas regulation will come under the control of both states, and that some federal land previously appropriated from the state governments will be returned.[30]: 11  The PH-BN government set up a parallel system of village governance, mostly but not entirely in opposition-led states. These often relied on BN appointees from the pre-2018 period.[30]: 8  During this administration, Penang, Johor, Terengganu, Sabah, and Sarawak all sought larger fiscal transfers.[30]: 12–15  Oil revenue came under further dispute, with Sabah and Sarawak seeking control of all oil produced from the continental shelf extending from their states. Terengganu has also sought such control, although Terengganu lacks the same legal basis, and its claim was rejected by the federal government.[30]: 19–21  Sarawak has even had limited success in pursuing autonomy over education, which is a federal competency.[30]: 22  The Regent of Johor called in June 2024 for his state to be treated as an equal to the federal government.[30]: 18  One area where the PH-BN administration has given greater grants that previous administrations is Ecological Fiscal Transfers, which are given to states to ensure the conservation of natural forest areas.[30]: 16 

Restoration of Sabah and Sarawak status

[edit]

In conjunction with the celebration of Malaysia Day in 2018 under the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) government, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad promised to restore Sabah and Sarawak status in the Malaysian federation in accordance with the Malaysia Agreement, restoring "their status from merely a state to an equal partner of the Malayan states".[31][32] Although the status of both entities were clearly defined in Article I, Malaysia Agreement 1963 as 'states' which shall be federated with the existing states of the Federation of Malaya.[33] However, through the process of the amendment, the bill failed to pass following the failure to reach two-thirds majority support (148 votes) in the Parliament with only 138 agreed with the move while 59 abstained from the voting.[34][35][36] Nevertheless, the Malaysian federal government agreed to review the 1963 agreement to remedy breaches of the treaty with the "Special Cabinet Committee To Review the Malaysia Agreement" and directed a Special Task Force Team (Taskforce MA63) to prepare a final report on the 1963 agreement before 31 August 2019.[37][38]

Two years after the failed attempt, on 16 September 2021, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob pledged to look into issues relating to Sabah and Sarawak via the Special Council on Malaysia Agreement 1963, with negotiations being chaired by the Prime Minister, joined by the Chief Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak, as well as eight federal ministers.[39] On 19 October 2021, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Sabah and Sarawak Affairs) Maximus Ongkili announced a Bill to be tabled in the coming Parliament sitting after the Special Council on Malaysia Agreement 1963 agreed to Articles 1(2) and 160(2) of the Federal Constitution to restore Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners to Peninsular Malaysia. The proposed law differs from the 2019 proposed amendments by the then Pakatan Harapan government, being tabled by Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Law and Parliament) Wan Junaidi. Discussions on restoring Sabahans and Sarawakians' rights will continue in the meantime. The same meeting also saw the council agree to empower both the Sabah and Sarawah governments to issue deep fishing licences as opposed to the federal government currently.[40] The amendments were tabled on 3 November 2021, consisting of four changes, being restoring Sabah and Sarawak as "partners", defining Malaysia Day as the day when Sabah and Sarawak joined and changes to the definition of the Federation, and defining who are natives of Sabah and Sarawak.[41] On 14 December 2021, the proposed amendment was passed in the Parliament unanimously with 199 votes in favour, and 21 MPs absent from the 6-hour long debate.[42] On 6 January 2022, Minister Ongkili announced the setting up of a joint technical committee to study Sabah's proposal for increased annual grants in addition to a counteroffer from the Federal Government.[43]

Federal-state relations

[edit]

While the population of Malaysia is ethnically and religiously diverse, such diversity is spread throughout the country and not inherently reflected by the borders of the states. (There is a significant distinction however between the peninsular states and the two states of East Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, which have large indigenous populations.)[14] Instead, the establishment of a federal system reflected a compromise to preserve the power of the Malay sultanates. In practice, the system allowed enough power to be exercised by the central government that it has been described as "quasi-federal".[11]: 92  One former chief minister stated that states in Malaysia have less power than the local governments of other federations.[28]: 304  Differences between states are prominent mostly in the governance of Islam, and in the functioning of the monarchy.[11]: 93  (In states without Sultans, the King fills their role for Islam.)[1]: 175 

The Malaysian constitution provides less autonomy to its states than might be expected in a federal system, creating a relatively centralised country. Furthermore, while the formal powers of states have remained mostly the same since independence, and while states retain similar administrative bodies, their power and capacity has been informally curtailed through various direct efforts of the national government, as well as being practically constrained by fiscal limitations.[23]: 489, 494, 497  Historically, most state elections (Sarawak being a notable consistent exception) have occurred alongside national elections, strengthening the electoral influence of the national government campaign. Beginning in 2020, many state electoral calendars began to diverge from the national one, meaning state issues were more widely discussed and state political leaders have gained larger public profiles.[23]: 498–499 [30]: 22–23  State electoral boundaries tend not to cross national parliamentary boundaries, creating a direct geographical hierarchy between state and national parliament.[16]: 215  Overall, the power of the national government compared to the states, especially during the decades of BN rule, led the country to be sometimes described as effectively unitary with "federal features",[10]: 194–195  or a country with "minimalist" federalism.[21]: 163  This diminishment of state power reflected similar losses of power elsewhere, such as in the national legislature, the judiciary, the media, and civil society, as the power of the executive government grew.[10]: 194–195 

States have no power over the federal constitution, and the central government can amend state constitutions. Where laws conflict, federal law takes precedence, although the constitution does contain provisions for judicial review upon a conflict arising between state and federal government, or between states.[17]: 7  Per the constitution, laws affecting the concurrent list do not take effect for four weeks (unless the matter is declared urgent), theoretically to allow time for federal-state consultation on their implementation.[28]: 306  The Federal Court of Malaysia adjudicates such conflicts. Both the Prime Minister and the Conference of Rulers (made up of the heads of all states) advise the King on the appointment of judges.[20]

The approval of the Conference of Rulers is needed for any changes affecting royalty, state borders (although not the admittance of new states), freedom of expression, citizenship, privileges given to federal and state parliaments, and federal guarantees regarding state constitutions.[20][28]: 303  Aside from that, their role, and that of the King, is mostly symbolic and ceremonial.[21]: 148–149  It is through their role in the states, and their representation in the Conference of Rulers, that the Sultans are able to wield informal influence.[11]: 106  The legislature of each state selects two individuals to represent the state in the national Senate. The federal territories are altogether represented by four senators, who are appointed by the King on the advice of the federal government, along with the other 40 senators.[28]: 328 

Venn diagram of federal and state legislative powers
Federal and state competencies are laid out in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia

The Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia divides powers into three lists: exclusively federal competencies, exclusively state competencies, and a concurrent list where both have input. The federal list includes trade, industry and development, foreign affairs, law, internal security and policing, and education.[17]: 6  Malaysian states have control of Islamic law, native administration, local government, and land and natural resource use. Through the concurrent list, states also have a role in managing welfare, water and irrigation, planning, culture, sports, and health. Control of land is key to the funding of state governments, although many take on debt from the central government.[17]: 6 [14][19]: 8 [28]: 300–301 

Administration of the law and courts is a federal matter. However, an exception is made for Islamic law, for which a separate Syariah Court system exists in each state. Since 1988, Syariah rulings cannot be appealed in the federal courts, and there are no courts higher than the state courts, meaning there are 14 (one for each state and one for all federal territories) distinct Syariah law systems. In Peninsular Malaysia Syariah courts also rule on Malay customary law (adat), as these matters overlap due to the constitutional association of Malay ethnicity and the Islamic religion. In Sabah and Sarawak, there are separate customary court systems for Malay customary law and for the customary law of other bumiputera.[28]: 314, 326–327  The central government does apply pressure on states to adopt similar Syariah laws, often through the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, differences remain in areas such as polygamy and female-initiated divorce. Kelantan has implemented strong hudud laws mandating punishments under Islamic law, but as Syariah courts may only enforce civil law and punishments are considered criminal law, any such rulings are unenforceable.[28]: 315–316 

Theoretically, any matter not set out in the Ninth Schedule can be legislated on by the individual states. However, legal scholars generally view this as a "pauper's bequest" because of the large scope of the matters listed in the Ninth Schedule. The courts themselves have generally favoured a broad interpretation of the language of the Ninth Schedule, thus limiting the number of possible subjects not covered.[44] The Parliament of Malaysia is permitted to legislate on issues of land, Islamic religion and local government to provide for a uniform law between different states, or on the request of the state assembly concerned. The law in question must also be passed by the state assembly as well, except in the case of certain land law-related subjects. Issues that fall under the purview of the state may also be legislated on at the federal level for the purpose of conforming with international treaty obligations.[44][11]: 95  While states must be consulted before laws are introduced for this purpose, they have no right to veto, and resulting law becomes both federal and state law.[28]: 301  However, the "sensitive issues" of Islamic law, Malay customs, and native laws and customs in Sabah and Sarawak cannot be modified for international treaty purposes.[28]: 301–302 

The Tenth Schedule of the constitution sets out federal and state financing.[30]: 5  States have very limited revenue generating powers,[19]: 12  and thus limited funding. With most taxes, customs, and licensing controlled by the federal government, states mostly rely on natural resource revenue, and returns from entertainment and religious institutions.[23]: 500 [28]: 329  These funding streams are highly dependent on geography, creating significant inter-state inequality, although even rich states remain limited. All states combined raised a tenth of what the federal government raised in 2016, and state expenditures amount to perhaps only 7% of overall government expenditure (another 3% comes from local government). This leaves states unable to provide many services. (The federally funded Universiti Sains Malaysia, based in Penang, has double the budget of the entire Penang government.)[23]: 500  Federal grants are distributed to states to allow them to provide services, and are usually given with very specific purposes[19]: 13, 15  approved by the federal government. Federal approval is also needed for state governments to borrow money, and is only allowed for capital expenditure.[23]: 500  Federal control over economic development further increases control over the large infrastructure projects such expenditure would fund.[25]: 426  Some state funding is provided by the central government from revenues, allocated according to a constitutionally-mandated formula related to state population. Other grants are ad hoc.[28]: 329  From 2013-2022, transfers to state governments fluctuated around 2.5% of total federal expenditure.[30]: 12  Overall, states fund about 80% of their activities.[19]: 13  Existing imbalances between state contributions to GDP and fiscal transfers to states have led to calls for increased funding from states contributing relatively much more than they receive in grants.[30]: 12–14 

In some states, especially smaller ones, state government composition is influenced by the composition of the national government. This may help secure funding for the state.[30]: 3  During the period of BN dominance, state branches of UMNO were often controlled by the central government, effectively meaning states could be controlled through party management.[23]: 492, 499  Many states have ceded some authority in order to balance their budgets, and the provision of subsidies as decided by the National Finance Council provides another method for the national government to influence state policy.[21]: 163 [28]: 331  While states appoint one representative each to the council, the federal government appoints others to the council, and council decisions are not binding on the Prime Minister.[19]: 11 

While the civil services of the former Unfederated Malay States (Johor, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu) are controlled by those states, those of other states are led by central government appointees.[17]: 7–8  (Johor also uniquely possesses its own military forces.)[30]: 18  Despite civil servant salaries being paid for by state governments, states lacking control over their civil service have no veto over appointments, and civil service activities can be directed by the federal government.[19]: 10  This has meant the civil service has sometimes been uncooperative with opposition governments.[23]: 499  The federal government can establish joint services to manage matters relating to the federal government and one or more states, or to two or more states.[28]: 331–332  The federal government also appoints local council mayors, and can directly fund local activities, bypassing state governments.[19]: 10 

The federal parliament can make state law, and state rights can be suspended by the central government through the use of an Emergency Ordinance.[17]: 7  The state of emergency created by such an ordinance gives the federal parliament sweeping powers under which even most federal constitutional constraints do not apply. The only limits are that changes cannot be made to the "sensitive issues", or to religion, citizenship, or language.[28]: 302  In some past federal-state disputes, such as in the 1966 Sarawak constitutional crisis and the 1977 Kelantan Emergency, the national government has seized control of state administration. The Internal Security Act 1960 and its replacement, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, provide broad power to the national government to make detentions in the name of security, which has been used to target political opponents.[23]: 495 

Much central government control falls directly under the Prime Minister's Department (PMD), which controls the Election Commission of Malaysia, the Petronas company, and the Federal Land Development Authority, among other departments.[23]: 496  In multiple administrations, the Prime Minister has also held the position as Minister of Finance, strengthening their fiscal control.[23]: 495  Overlapping institutions and the presence of economic corridors under federal control, provide mechanisms for federal control of competencies formally assigned to states.[23]: 493–494 

The creation of the overlapping institutions duplicated state government services, providing the federal government mechanisms for formal control over what are constitutionally state competencies.[25]: 430–431, 436  State parliaments can request the national parliament to legislate for it, as this was used for the creation of the National Land Code 1966 and the Local Government Act 1976, which were requested by all states (although they do not apply to Sabah and Sarawak).[11]: 95–96  These laws provide uniformity across the states (outside of Sabah and Sarawak), despite being constitutionally state competencies.[28]: 305  Their operative institutions, the National Land Council and the National Council for Local Government (NCLG), create national-level policies that must be implemented by federal and state governments. (Forestry outside of Sabah and Sarawak has also become uniform, as the National Land Council created the National Forestry Council in 1971, leading to the National Forestry Act 1984.)[28]: 312  As the NCLG provides a mechanism through which the central government controls local governments.[17]: 7–8 [11]: 103  Local government is thus quite similar across the country,[11]: 93  outside of Sabah and Sarawak, which each have distinct systems.[11]: 100  (Sabah and Sarawak send non-voting representatives to the NCLG.)[28]: 331  The National Finance Council plays a similar role for state budgets.[30]: 5 

Outside of these three bodies and the Conference of Rulers, there is little coordination between state governments.[28]: 318  The national government can request that a state government exercise executive or administrative powers constitutionally assigned to the federal government. Federalism is thus often a cooperative exercise between the central and state governments.[11]: 96 [21]: 163 [28]: 306  If the federal government requests such actions, it must provide funding to the state for this purpose.[28]: 328 

State control over oil and natural gas has been appropriated by the federal government.[21]: 163  The federal government also has direct control over six local authorities designated as "development authorities". While some were turned into federal territory (Labuan and Putrajaya), two remain in Johor, one in Pahang, and one in Kedah.[11]: 108–109 [45]

Sabah and Sarawak

[edit]
The building hosting the Sarawak State Legislative Assembly

Sabah and Sarawak did not have strong historical, cultural, or demographic links to Malaya at the time of federation. They also had vastly different economic needs. Their admittance to the federation came with agreements that they would retain a larger ability to managed their own affairs to reflect this.[23]: 491  Sabah and Sarawak have greater control of their land, development, immigration, native customs, religious affairs, historical sites, and ports and harbours.[23]: 496, 499  The relatively greater autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak means that Malaysian federalism is asymmetric.[14][11]: 92  The states of Sabah and Sarawak merged with the existing states of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore pursuant to the Malaysia Agreement in 1963 to form the independent state of Malaysia. Representatives from Sabah and Sarawak demanded a higher degree of autonomy as part of the bargain which were included in the 20-point agreement and 18-point agreement respectively. While both states arguably joined the federation as equals to Malaya, the Malayan government and constitution became the Malaysian government and constitution. The constitutional amendment codifying the enlarged federation initially listed Sabah and Sarawak separately to the other states, however it was later amended again to list both these entities together with the other states, suggesting a status equal to the original states of Malaya. Sabah and Sarawak still retained a higher degree of autonomy than the peninsular states in areas such as immigration, state revenue, and legislative power over land and local government. However, federal influence over their politics increased over time, including direct interference in the state assemblies.[14][46]

The East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak have greater autonomy that those on the peninsula,[14] with lists of state power supplemental to those that apply to all states.[28]: 305 [11]: 94  These include additional powers over their immigration controls as part of the 20-point agreement and 18-point agreement drawn up by the respective states when they formed Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak have separate immigration policies and controls and a unique residency status.[47] Sabah and Sarawak also have greater fiscal powers, their own legal systems, and vetos on constitutional changes.[14] They are not required to have Islam as an official religion, and can determine their own official language.[16]: 217  Some federal laws, such as those relating to land and local government, do not apply in these states.[28]: 305  Safeguards protect the appointment of judges in those states, and the provision of citizenship.[28]: 303  Both states have a greater ability to borrow money, introduce tax (although this was not used until 1998), and apply export duties to natural resources. Sabah also has control over railways.[28]: 305  Their Governors have vetos over constitutional changes that affect their states, namely changes to the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, to their state legislation, and to the rights of their indigenous people.[21]: 148  Lawyers require a connection to either state to practice in its courts, unless given an exception by the state government.[28]: 320  Water remains a state competency in Sabah and Sarawak, despite being shifted to the concurrent list for other states.[28]: 313 

Sabah and Sarawak control immigration through the Immigration Act 1959/63.[11]: 96  This was intended to prevent West Malaysian immigration, but has at times been used to reduce federal government scrutiny.[28]: 305  Passports are required even for Peninsular Malaysians for travelling between either state and Peninsular Malaysia, or between the two states, however those who are on social/business visits up to three months are allowed to produce a MyKad or birth certificate and obtain a special printout form in lieu of a passport.[citation needed]

Political relations between the Bornean states and the central government are often fraught, with the state governments fearing West Malaysian dominance, while the national government fears separatism.[16]: 221  The historical erosion of autonomy has been linked to occasional calls for secession in both East Malaysian states, where such discussion is more common than it is in West Malaysian states. This is linked to the demographic and cultural differences already distinguishing these states from the others. While this discontent has sometimes been used by leaders in both states to extract concessions from the federal government, concessions have often been directly associated with particular East Malaysian politicians, rather than producing structural improvements.[23]: 501–502 

State governance

[edit]
Malaysia and its states' flags at Putra Square, Putrajaya

The governance of the states is divided between the federal government and the state governments, while the federal territories are directly administered by the federal government.[48]

Nine of the peninsular states, based on historical Malay kingdoms, are known as the Malay states. Each Malay state has a hereditary ruler as titular head of state[20] The rulers of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, Perak, Selangor and Terengganu are styled Sultans. Negeri Sembilan's elective ruler holds the title of Yang di-Pertuan Besar, whereas the ruler of Perlis is titled King.[2]: 329  The federal head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (commonly referred to as "King" in English), is elected (de facto rotated) among the nine hereditary rulers to serve a 5-year term.[11]: 94  Despite being constitutional monarchs, the rulers have significant informal influence, and are associated with both the Malay ethnicity and Islam.[16]: 215  Malacca, Penang, Sabah, and Sarawak have Governors[11]: 93, 108  (styled Yang di-Pertua Negeri)[1]: 175  appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.[2]: 329 

Each state has its own constitution, which must conform with the principles of the national constitution. Each state also has a Westminster-style unicameral legislature[11]: 93  called the Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN), which vary in size between states from 15 members (Perlis) to 82 members (Sarawak). As with the federal parliament, members of DUN are elected through first-past-the-post voting in single-member constituencies[23]: 497  drawn based on population.[citation needed] The term of DUN members is five years[2]: 330  unless the assembly is dissolved earlier by the Ruler or Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. Usually, DUN of the states in Peninsular Malaysia are dissolved in conjunction with the dissolution of the federal parliament, to have state elections running concurrently with the parliamentary election. However, Rulers and Governors hold discretionary powers in withholding consent to dissolve the DUN.[citation needed] Each state sends two senators elected by the DUN to the Dewan Negara (Senate), the upper house of the federal parliament.[28]: 328  While the main court system is national, each state has its own Syariah Court system.[16]: 215 

States have an executive Chief Minister as politically responsible head of government.[11]: 93  (In the Malay states chief ministers are known as Menteri Besar, while in Malacca, Penang, and Sabah they are referred to as ketua menteri. In Sarawak, the title "Premier" has been used since 2022).[10]: 208 [11]: 109 [23]: 497  These are appointed by the relevant ruler or governor from the DUN if they have the support of the majority of the state legislature. The chief minister heads an executive council (Council of State in Peninsular Malaysia, Supreme Council in Sarawak, and Cabinet in Sabah).[2]: 329–330  State departments either report to the state government, or to the state government and the federal government. The latter includes the chief ministers department, except for those of Sabah and Sarawak (other historically state-run departments in those two states have become more similar to those of the Peninsular states).[2]: 330–331 

Each peninsular state is divided into districts, which are in turn divided into sub-districts (mukim). The lowest level is the village (kampung), whose chief receives and allowance but is not considered a public servant. In Sabah and Sarawak districts are grouped into "Divisions" (also called a "Residency" in Sabah), and they have their own local government systems.[49][2]: 331–333 

Federal territory governance

[edit]

The 3 federal territories were formed for different purposes: Kuala Lumpur was separated from Selangor to have an independent national capital, Putrajaya from Selangor as the administrative centre of the federal government, and Labuan from Sabah to serve as an offshore financial centre.[27]: 7, 11 [23]: 491  The territories fall under the purview of the Ministry of the Federal Territories, and the Parliament of Malaysia legislates on all matters concerning the territories.[50] Each federal territory elects representatives from single-member constituencies to the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) of the Parliament: 11 for Kuala Lumpur, and 1 each for Labuan and Putrajaya. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong appoints senators to represent the territories in the Dewan Negara: two for Kuala Lumpur, and one each for Labuan and Putrajaya.[2]: 321–322 

The federal government has jurisdiction over what would be state competencies in federal territories.[22]: 70 [28]: 305  There are no subnational elections in the federal territories, even in Kuala Lumpur, whose governmental budget exceeds that of most states.[23]: 501  A joint Syariah legal system applies to all three territories.[28]: 314  The local governments for the territories varies: Kuala Lumpur is administered by the Kuala Lumpur City Hall (Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur), headed by an appointed mayor (Datuk Bandar), while Putrajaya is administered by the Putrajaya Corporation (Perbadanan Putrajaya) and Labuan by the Labuan Corporation (Perbadanan Labuan); each corporation is headed by a chairman.

Singapore and Brunei

[edit]

Singapore was a Malaysian state from the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 until it was expelled from the Federation on 9 August 1965. During its time as a state of Malaysia, Singapore had autonomy in the areas of education and labour and was the smallest state in Malaysia by land area, but the largest by population.[51]

After the Second World War the United Kingdom sought to integrate Brunei with North Borneo and Sarawak, but the Bruneian Sultan was reluctant to cede political control or share oil revenues.[24]: 17  When discussions took place about a larger union in the 1960s, Brunei invited to join the Federation but decided not to in the end due to several issues, such as the status of the Sultan within Malaysia, division of Bruneian oil royalties, and pressure from opposition groups which amounted to the Brunei Revolt.

See also

[edit]

Administrative divisions:

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ The code MY10 is not used in FIPS 10-4 but was used for FIPS 10-3[52] (for Sabah)
  2. ^ Territories named in official language for both FIPS 10-4 and ISO 3166-2:MY code lists[53]
  3. ^ Wilayah Persekutuan defined as the territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. Used by FIPS only

References

[edit]
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